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Stanley Fischer  Lessons  from East Asia and the 
Pacific Rim 
THERE  HAS  BEEN  SO much research on the East Asian miracle during the 
past decade that it is hard to imagine that anything more remains to be 
discovered-except  for the ever-elusive  elixir of growth. Despite  that, 
we need to keep studying these extraordinary experiences,  and the three 
excellent  symposium papers in this volume provide much enlightenment 
and food  for thought. 
I start by discussing  a few  points  that come  up in the papers,  and 
then turn, first, to other research on East Asia,  and second,  to related 
experiences  in Asia  and the Pacific Rim. 
East Asia 
There really has been a miracle in East Asia-and  that would be true 
even if there had been no productivity growth in the region. The miracle 
is that the living standards of over a billion people are being transformed 
at a rate that doubles per capita income in a decade.  Per capita income 
levels  in formerly  very poor economies-Hong  Kong,  Korea,  Singa- 
pore,  and Taiwan-have  almost  reached  those  of  the  industrialized 
countries  within  a generation.  And even  if we  leave  China out of the 
calculation  and speak of hundreds of millions  rather than billions,  we 
are still dealing  with an unprecedented phenomenon. i 
A  second  important point  on  East  Asia,  which  is  emphasized  in 
Takatoshi  Ito's  paper,  is  that there  is  almost  no  generalization  that 
applies to every fast-growing  country in East Asia,  not even the fact of 
very  high  rates  of  investment  and saving,  where  Hong  Kong  is  the 
exception.  Although  Hong  Kong  is  different  because  it  serves  as  a 
gateway to China, we need to be aware of the exceptions  listed by Ito 
to the standard generalizations. 
The views expressed  are those of the author  and not necessarily  those of the Inter- 
national  Monetary  Fund. 
1. It is likely that current  statistical  methods  somewhat  exaggerate  China's growth 
and that the double-digit  growth rates of recent years will tend to disappear  when the 
data  are rebased.  The Chinese miracle  would be hardly  less impressive  for the change. 
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A great deal has been made recently of the generally low productivity 
growth rates found in East Asian economies.  East Asian  growth,  it is 
said,  is due "merely"  to high saving rates. Far from being a caution, 
that would  be  an extremely  encouraging  result,  for  it  means  that a 
country does not need superhuman qualities to grow,  but needs only to 
save and invest enough. 
However,  as Susan Collins  and Barry Bosworth  emphasize  in their 
paper, there remains the critical question of how to produce such saving 
rates.  One view  is that growth produces saving,  via the life  cycle  hy- 
pothesis.  As Christine Paxson has recently  shown,  the evidence  is not 
really consistent  with that view.2 In some countries,  such as Singapore, 
government-mandated saving schemes have been an important element 
in  increasing  saving.  Postal  saving  schemes  have  also  helped.  The 
correlation between  saving or investment  and growth is extremely  im- 
pressive,  and I am convinced  that increasing the share of investment  is 
one  of  the keys  to increasing  growth.  But we  do have  to explain  the 
Hong Kong exception. 
We must also remember that it is no mean feat to be able to stay on 
the production function while investing 40 percent of GDP. Paul Krug- 
man  has  argued  that the  East  Asians  should  be  wary  of  the  Soviet 
precedent,  but the Soviets  did not stay on the production function  as 
they accumulated capital at very high rates; rather, productivity growth 
was negative.  Even though Yung Chul Park has warned us that much 
of  the investment  in East Asia  is  wasteful,  the aggregate evidence  is 
that investment in East Asia has been about as efficient as in the leading 
industrial countries,  despite extraordinary rates of investment.  That is 
a key part of the miracle. 
We need also to remember that estimates  of productivity growth are 
sensitive  to both the assumed parameters of the production function and 
its functional  form.  My International Monetary Fund (IMF) colleague 
Michael  Sarel shows,  in a recent paper, that by varying capital's  share 
within the range of 0.3  to 0.5,  and by making some  other reasonable 
assumptions,  he can produce a wide range of productivity growth esti- 
mates for individual eceonomies  of the Association  of South-East Asian 
Nations  and can even  reverse the ranking of productivity growth rates 
across  countries.3  We  do  not yet  have  a firm fix on  the behavior  of 
2.  Paxson  (1996). 
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productivity growth in different countries-and  that is hardly surprising 
when we are working with an aggregate production function estimated 
for an economy  undergoing extraordinary structural change,  involving 
massive  intersectoral shifts of resources. 
What Else? 
In a recent paper, Joseph Stiglitz  tries to summarize the lessons  of 
East Asian success  and asks whether the policy  successes  of the region 
can be duplicated in other countries.4 The lessons  he draws are not very 
different from those described in this volume.  Stiglitz lays heavy stress 
on the role of government,  a view  that is widely  shared. Two  aspects 
should be emphasized.  First, governments have consistently  used mar- 
kets,  rather than trying to supplant them: in the noncommunist  coun- 
tries,  production has generally  been a private sector activity;  govern- 
ments have used price signals,  rather than trying to suppress them; and 
their policies  have all been heavily  export-oriented.  This latter aspect 
is critical.  The World Bank study of the East Asian miracle stresses the 
role of contests  among firms as a means of ensuring competition  even 
before  international  market competition  dominated.  Second,  govern- 
ments have been  adaptable: in the lower-income  countries,  they have 
been  active  in helping  to direct resource flows,  partly through the al- 
location  of  credit;  and,  as  incomes  have  risen  and institutions  have 
developed,  markets have played an increasing role. 
It is also necessary  to place heavy emphasis on macroeconomic  sta- 
bility.  None  of  the  East  Asian  countries  shows  much  tolerance  for 
inflation. In working on another paper, I have looked at an international 
poll on popular attitudes to inflation,  and the data for East Asia  stand 
out. The strongest aversion to inflation is found not in Germany, but in 
Chinese countries and Singapore.  And governments have acted accord- 
ingly. 
Yung  Chul Park has asked who  would  help these  countries  if they 
got  into trouble.  Some,  including  Korea,  have been  in trouble in the 
past, and they have been helped by the IMF-which  will help again, if 
needed. That is easy to predict, because East Asian countries have acted 
very quickly and forcefully  when macroeconomic  instability has threat- 
ened. Their economies  have reacted rapidly, in part because it is easier 
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to adjust when investment is at 40 percent of GDP, and a major adjust- 
ment can be made by cutting investment  back to the still-high  level  of 
30 percent of GDP. 
MIT 
Although  the entire East Asian  experience  gives  grounds for opti- 
mism about the prospects  for development,  that is particularly true of 
Malaysia,  Indonesia,  and Thailand (MIT).  In the distant past,  China, 
Japan, and Korea have been very advanced countries; today,  they are 
in some sense returning to an interrupted growth path. That is not true 
of the MIT countries,  which nonetheless  have also grown at remarkable 
rates-in  Malaysia's  case,  while  implementing  policies  to ensure that 
the benefits  of  growth  reach the indigenous  population.  Indonesia  is 
similarly  impressive,  because  only thirty years ago it did not seem set 
for sustained growth that would radically reduce the poverty rate. 
The experience  of these three countries suggests  that it is possible  to 
transform a poor country, with no previous development  record, within 
a generation.  How? All  have shown  good economic  management and 
have broad-based primary education.  The role of government has dif- 
fered,  being  very  active  in  Malaysia  and  Indonesia,  but  less  so  in 
Thailand.  Indonesia  has not relied  on exports of  manufactured goods 
to  the  same  extent  as the others,  but has had the benefit  of  oil.  (Of 
course,  turning oil  into a benefit and not a curse takes good policies.) 
Each has been reasonably open to imports. All have maintained reason- 
able macroeconomic  stability,  although each is currently suffering from 
a capital inflows problem and running a large current account deficit- 
much larger for Malaysia  and Thailand than for Indonesia. 
Any of these countries could be vulnerable to an abrupt reversal of 
confidence.  But  the  high  levels  of  investment  in  each  give  room  to 
adjust without having to cut consumption  sharply.  A fiscal tightening 
would be part of the adjustment. It has been argued in this volume that 
contractionary fiscal policy  leads to capital inflows because it increases 
confidence  in the country. While that effect  may be there, the predom- 
inant effect reducing inflows is likely to arise from the reduced pressure 
on interest rates that a tightening of fiscal policy  would bring. 
Is there a regional growth effect  for the countries in this part of the 
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from the growth of regional markets, but also from learning that success 
is possible  and what policies  can help to produce it. 
Other Asian and Pacific Rim Countries 
Developments  in neighboring countries (broadly construed) are also 
important. India, with its population approaching one billion,  stands at 
the  threshold  of  East  Asian-style  growth.  Indian reforms  have  been 
gaining  strength in recent years,  and while  much remains to be done, 
the new Indian government is continuing down the reform path. Growth 
in the 5 to 6 percent range seems well established.  One day we will  see 
a South Asian  miracle,  in which  the constraints  that have  kept India 
growing  more slowly  than it should-including  an excessive  govern- 
ment budget deficit-will  be overcome,  and India will  be able to de- 
velop  its agricultural sector as a basis  for and complement  to the de- 
velopment  of  the  industrial  sector.  And  then  we  may  see  the  other 
countries of South Asia growing  more rapidly too. 
Finally,  let me talk about one other Pacific Rim country,  which we 
have tended to exclude  from discussion  in this volume:  Chile.  Here is 
another country with an extraordinary growth record. Not much of what 
is supposed to be special about the East Asian experience  applies in the 
case of Chile.  Its policies  have largely followed  the Washington  con- 
sensus (except  with respect to financial sector liberalization  and open- 
ness to external capital,  where it has used some of the same controls as 
have been used in Korea). 
One  of  the  lessons  to  be  drawn from  the  Chilean  case  and from 
another Pacific  Rim case,  New  Zealand,  is just how  long  it takes for 
the growth process to take hold after stabilization  and the beginning  of 
reform. It took somewhere between five and thirteen years for sustained 
growth to begin in Chile,  depending on whether you count the reforms 
as starting in 1982 or 1974. New Zealand was reforming for seven years 
before its growth started. 
Concluding  Comments 
What are the prospects  in this region?  First,  the growth process  is 
not about to collapse:  the notion that, because  this is largely an exten- 
sive  growth  process,  it  has  to  end  abruptly is  just  wrong.  Second, 
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not  all  of  its  mechanisms  are well  understood.  Countries have  to be 
vigilant  to  ensure  that they  do  not  destroy  the  process  by  allowing 
overheating  or otherwise  allowing  the  macroeconomy  to  get  out  of 
hand. But none of the East Asian countries has pursued an excessively 
easy macroeconomic  policy,  none has tolerated even double-digit  infla- 
tion,  and most have small  governments  and small budget deficits.  So 
the risk of  a prolonged  slowdown  caused by a need for major macro- 
economic  adjustments is small. 
Nonetheless,  the view that growth in East Asian countries will even- 
tually slow as these countries get closer to the frontier is almost certainly 
right. That is already happening,  painfully,  in Japan. It will  happen to 
the richer East Asian  countries  as they approach the income  levels  of 
the industrialized  countries.  But China and the poorer countries  have 
many years of convergence  ahead of them. 
One  final  comment.  Every  student  of  the  East  Asian  experience 
makes a long  list of the ingredients of success,  but every one of them 
ends up feeling  that is not the whole  story,  that something-the  elixir 
of growth-is  missing.  At that point,  most say that the whole  package 
is important: it is not just saving,  nor just primary education,  nor just 
exports,  nor just using markets, nor just macroeconomic  stability,  nor 
just an intrusive or nonintrusive role for the state. It is all of these.  Yet, 
as Ito has reminded us,  not all of  the conditions  are necessary,  even 
though  most  of  them  are.  The  successes  of  Chile  and New  Zealand 
suggest  further caution  in drawing definitive  conclusions.  We do not 
have a set of necessary conditions,  nor do we yet have a set of sufficient 
conditions. 
That means  we  can  look  forward to  continuing  this  discussion  in 
future years.  I hope that ten years from now we will  be discussing  the 
lessons  of  the Indian miracle,  and not much later,  the lessons  of  the 
African miracle. 
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